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An Anatomy of the French Labour Market 
Abstract 
[Excerpt] Over the last decades, many European countries have experienced high and persistent 
unemployment rates. The bulk of labour market research has tackled this issue by emphasizing the effect 
of employment protection legislation, hereafter EPL, on labour market performance. As a result, the 
importance of labour market flexibility has been widely acknowledged. This view can be summarized by 
the expressed desire of the E.U. council to give member States incentives to “review and, where 
appropriate, reform overly restrictive elements in employment legislation that affect labour market 
dynamics [...] and to undertake other appropriate measures to promote a better balance between work 
and private life and between flexibility and security”. It is however striking that most of the reforms 
undertaken have contrasted sharply with this latter recommendation by favouring reforms at the margin. 
Those reforms have fostered two-tier systems, as the increase in labour market flexibility has taken place 
mainly through a series of marginal reforms that liberalized the use of fixed-term and/or non-standard 
employment contracts. Two-tier systems have promoted the emergence of dual employment protection 
which can be broadly defined as the coexistence of both long-term contracts, which benefit from stringent 
protection, and short-term contracts with little or no protection. It is often argued that this combination 
creates labour market segmentation, traps workers in a recurring sequence of frequent unemployment 
spells, favours unequal repartition of risk between workers and enhances inequalities. In particular, two-
tier systems create excess labour turnover as they increase the incentives to create temporary rather than 
permanent jobs, reduce job destruction for stable jobs, but increase churning for temporary jobs. For 
instance in countries with stringent legal constraints on the termination of permanent jobs, such as 
France or Spain, it turns out that about 70 per cent to 90 per cent of entries into employment are in 
temporary jobs with very short duration (on average less than one month and a half in France). If excess 
labour turnover and its consequences are a concern for the economy as a whole, the dramatic spread of 
temporary jobs is even more a concern for young/less experienced workers as they are more likely to be 
negatively affected by the adverse effects of dual employment protection. 
The French labour market is no exception and has faced similar trends during the 1990s. Given the 
pervasiveness of temporary jobs on the labour market and their consequences on the society and 
economic outcomes, it is urgent to understand how two-tier systems shape the functioning of the labour 
market. This is the very purpose of the present report. 
After having described in details the salient features of the French dual labour market and having 
discussed the legislation at the root of French dualism, we review the different mechanisms through 
which dualism affect labour markets: labour market dynamics, wage inequality, human capital 
accumulation, job satisfaction, social integration and health. We consider whenever possible both 
theoretical insights and empirical evaluations. We finally conclude this report by providing possible 
directions to reform the labour market. 
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Preface 
The primary goal of the ILO is to contribute, with member States, to achieve full and 
productive employment and decent work for all, including women and young people, a goal 
embedded in the ILO Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair Globalization (2008),
1
 and 
which has now been widely adopted by the international community. The integrated 
approach to do this was further reaffirmed by the 2010 Resolution concerning employment 
policies for social justice and a fair globalization.
2  
 
In order to support member States and the social partners to reach this goal, the ILO 
pursues a Decent Work Agenda which comprises four interrelated areas: Respect for 
fundamental worker’s rights and international labour standards, employment promotion, 
social protection and social dialogue. Explanations and elaborations of this integrated 
approach and related challenges are contained in a number of key documents: in those 
explaining the concept of decent work,
3
 in the Employment Policy Convention, 1964 (No. 
122), in the Global Employment Agenda and, as applied to crisis response, in the Global 
Jobs Pact adopted by the 2009 International Labour Conference in the aftermath of the 
2008 global economic crisis. 
The Employment Sector is fully engaged in supporting countries placing employment 
at the centre of their economic and social policies, using these complementary frameworks, 
and is doing so through a large range of technical support and capacity building activities, 
policy advisory services and policy research. As part of its research and publications 
programme, the Employment Sector promotes knowledge-generation around key policy 
issues and topics conforming to the core elements of the Global Employment Agenda and 
the Decent Work Agenda. The Sector’s publications consist of books, monographs, 
working papers, employment reports and policy briefs. 
The Employment Working Papers series is designed to disseminate the main findings 
of research initiatives undertaken by the various departments and programmes of the 
Sector. The working papers are intended to encourage exchange of ideas and to stimulate 
debate. The views expressed are the responsibility of the author(s) and do not necessarily 
represent those of the ILO. 
 
JoséManuel Salazar-Xirinachs 
Executive Director 
Employment Sector 
 
1 See http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/dgo/download/dg_announce_en.pdf. 
2 See http://www.ilo.org/public/libdoc/ilo/2010/110B09_108_engl.pdf.   
3 See the successive Reports of the Director-General to the International Labour Conference: 
Decent work (1999); Reducing the decent work deficit: A global challenge (2001); Working out 
of poverty (2003).   
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Foreword 
One of the key features of the labour market developments observed during the past 
decades throughout the world relates to a phenomenon of labour market segmentation, e.g. 
the division of the labour market into separate submarkets or segments, distinguished by 
different characteristics and behavioural rules. To a large extent, these attributes depend on 
the specific environment in which workers operate. Segmentation may arise from 
particularities of labour market institutions, such as contractual arrangements (permanent 
versus temporary employment), their enforcement (and the resulting informality), as well 
as types of workers concerned (such as migrant, domestic, or dispatch workers).  
While the phenomenon is not new, the job crisis has brought an increasing attention 
to the segmentation/duality issue, especially in Europe. The implications and costs of 
segmentation are multiple, in both economic and social terms: they include wage gaps 
between segments, differences in access to training and social security, as well as in 
working conditions or tenure. Moreover, segmentation implies limited transitions to better 
jobs. The consequences of segmentation also have macroeconomic implications, such as 
lower productivity and higher employment volatility.  
In this context, and as part of its objective of promoting decent work, the ILO 
launched, in 2012, a research programme to better understand how labour market 
institutions affect employment outcomes in both quantitative and qualitative terms. One of 
the main motivations of the research project is to put job quality at the forefront of the 
policy debates, informing the main stakeholders in the world of work of the extent of 
labour market segmentation and its implications for job quality in selected countries. 
Fourteen country studies on labour market segmentation and job quality were provided by 
external country experts, as well as thematic papers on job quality in segmented labour 
markets and the role of labour law, collective bargaining, and improved enforcement. 
These studies were discussed in a scientific Workshop held at the ILO in December 2012 
and used as thematic inputs in a policy-oriented Workshop held at the ILO in April 2013. 
The current paper is one in the series of such country studies. It makes an important 
contribution to the discussion on contractual segmentation of labour markets, providing an 
overview of the institutional setup as well as empirical evidence on the extent of 
segmentation and its implications for various aspects of job quality. The paper also offers a 
policy perspective on the ways to alleviate the negative consequences of segmentation.  
  
 
Sandrine Cazes, Corinne Vargha, 
Chief of Industrial and Employment 
Employment Analysis and Research Unit   Relations Department 
Economic and Labour Market Analysis 
Department 
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 1 
1. Introduction4 
Over the last decades, many European countries have experienced high and persistent 
unemployment rates. The bulk of labour market research has tackled this issue by 
emphasizing the effect of employment protection legislation, hereafter EPL, on labour 
market performance. As a result, the importance of labour market flexibility has been 
widely acknowledged. This view can be summarized by the expressed desire of the E.U. 
council to give member States incentives to “review and, where appropriate, reform overly 
restrictive elements in employment legislation that affect labour market dynamics [...] and 
to undertake other appropriate measures to promote a better balance between work and 
private life and between flexibility and security”. It is however striking that most of the 
reforms undertaken have contrasted sharply with this latter recommendation by favouring 
reforms at the margin. 
Those reforms have fostered two-tier systems, as the increase in labour market 
flexibility has taken place mainly through a series of marginal reforms that liberalized the 
use of fixed-term and/or non-standard employment contracts. Two-tier systems have 
promoted the emergence of dual employment protection which can be broadly defined as 
the coexistence of both long-term contracts, which benefit from stringent protection, and 
short-term contracts with little or no protection. It is often argued that this combination 
creates labour market segmentation, traps workers in a recurring sequence of frequent 
unemployment spells, favours unequal repartition of risk between workers and enhances 
inequalities. In particular, two-tier systems create excess labour turnover as they increase 
the incentives to create temporary rather than permanent jobs, reduce job destruction for 
stable jobs, but increase churning for temporary jobs. For instance in countries with 
stringent legal constraints on the termination of permanent jobs, such as France or Spain, it 
turns out that about 70 per cent to 90 per cent of entries into employment are in temporary 
jobs with very short duration (on average less than one month and a half in France). If 
excess labour turnover and its consequences are a concern for the economy as a whole, the 
dramatic spread of temporary jobs is even more a concern for young/less experienced 
workers as they are more likely to be negatively affected by the adverse effects of dual 
employment protection.  
The French labour market is no exception and has faced similar trends during the 
1990s. Given the pervasiveness of temporary jobs on the labour market and their 
consequences on the society and economic outcomes, it is urgent to understand how two-
tier systems shape the functioning of the labour market. This is the very purpose of the 
present report. 
After having described in details the salient features of the French dual labour market 
and having discussed the legislation at the root of French dualism, we review the different 
mechanisms through which dualism affect labour markets: labour market dynamics, wage 
inequality, human capital accumulation, job satisfaction, social integration and health. We 
consider whenever possible both theoretical insights and empirical evaluations. We finally 
conclude this report by providing possible directions to reform the labour market.   
 
4
 Thomas Le Barbanchon is a Research Economist at Centre de Recherche en Économie et 
Statistique (CREST) in Paris. 
Franck Malherbet is an Associate Professor at the Université de Rouen and Research Affiliate at the 
Ecole Polytechnique, IZA, and the Fondazione Debenedetti. 
 
 2 
2. An anatomy of the French labour market 
Over the last decades, France has experienced high and persistent unemployment. 
Since the mid-eighties, the number of unemployed has remained over 2 millions (see figure 
1 below).  In 2010, 2.65 million of workers were unemployed in France. There were almost 
as many women
5
 as men (49.5 per cent vs. 50.5 per cent), 25.2 per cent of unemployed 
were young (between 15-24 years old), 58 per cent were between 25 and 49 years old and 
16.8 per cent between 50 and 64 years old. At the same time, in 2010, there were 25.8 
million workers in civilian employment, out of which 52.5 per cent are men. The 
proportion of young workers in civilian employment is 8.8 per cent and that of senior 
workers 25.4 per cent.   
 
Figure 1  Civilian employment and unemployment in France since 1990 
 
Source: OECD 
 
To moderate unemployment, France has conducted labour market reforms introducing 
flexibility at the margin. Those reforms have led to some employment segmentation 
between temporary and long-term jobs. This type of segmentation is discussed at length in 
our study. Other types of segmentation, such as formal/informal employment, are usually 
perceived as less stringent in the French case. For instance, according to a recent report by 
the Social Security Agency, 2.4 per cent of French workers are dissimulated.   
 
5
 The decomposition of unemployment and employment by gender and age is computed by the Insee 
using the French Labor Force Survey. 
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 2.1. Employment quantity and stability 
According to the French Labour Force Survey (LFS),
6
 in 2010, there were in the 
private sector 15.2 million workers with an open-ended contract (permanent/regular/long 
term job (LTJ) – “Contrat à durée indéterminée (CDI)”) and 2 million with a fixed-term 
contract (temporary/short term job (STJ) – “Contrat à durée déterminée (CDD)”).7 This 
means that the majority of French workers have open-ended contracts, while around 12 per 
cent of workers in the private sector have fixed-term contracts. According to administrative 
data, the public sector (ministries, local administration…) represented around 6.3 million 
workers in 2008 (last updated information by the Insee). The share of temporary jobs in the 
public sector is 16 per cent. In this report, we restrict to the private sector. 
The share of temporary jobs in the private sector is far higher among young workers 
aged between 15 and 24 years old than among prime-age workers (25-50) and senior 
workers (over 50): 39.9 per cent vs. 10.7 per cent and 7.0 per cent in 2010. It is also higher 
for women (15.2 per cent) than for men (9.1 per cent). The share of temporary jobs globally 
decreases with the level of education when other factors are controlled for (see the linear 
probability estimation in the appendix). Controlling for age when comparing contracts 
across different levels of education is very important as temporary jobs have impacted 
workers entering  the labour market since the 90s, and those workers are typically more 
educated than older generations. The share of   temporary jobs is 1.1 point (resp. 1.8 point) 
lower when workers hold a college degree (resp. a vocational degree) rather than an upper 
secondary degree. The duality of vocational degree is remarkable as workers with those 
degrees have the same number of years of education as workers with an upper secondary 
degree. 
Both employment statuses (temporary and permanent) have very different stability 
properties. Using the 2010 French Labour Force Surveys, we compute the quarterly 
transition rates between temporary and permanent employment, unemployment and a 
broader status (including inactivity, public sector and unusual STJ contracts such as 
temporary help agencies, seasonal work and apprenticeship). Table 1 shows that 96.9 per 
cent of workers with a LTJ are still employed in a LTJ one quarter later, while this fraction 
of stayers is 76.6 per cent among workers with a STJ. As expected workers with a LTJ have 
a more stable position than those with a STJ. In addition, the destinations of workers 
leaving STJ is much more diverse than the destinations of LTJ leavers. 5.6 per cent of 
former STJ workers upgrade and become employed into a LTJ and 9 per cent become 
unemployed. The most common destination of former LTJ workers is the unknown status, 
representing inactivity (downgrading to STJ contract is very unusual).  
 In the appendix (tables b-i), we compute the same transition table by age and by 
education. The tables show that younger workers (15-24 years old) have a higher risk to 
separate from both a LTJ and a STJ. Their situations are less stable. Yet their upgrading 
rates from STJ to LTJ are higher.   As expected, the unemployment exit rate is lower for 
unemployed with at most a degree from the lower secondary education. Besides, more 
educated workers seem to have more stable trajectories (their separation rates are lower 
from both contracts).    
 
6
 In this sub section, all statistics are computed from the French LFS. A detailed presentation of the 
data can be found in the Appendix.  
7
 In this report, we focus on the private sector, adding state-owned merchant firms. Note that we 
focus on regular STJ and exclude seasonal contracts, contracts with temporary help agencies and 
contracts for apprenticeship. Those contracts represent respectively 0.1, 0.5 and 0.4 million workers 
in 2010. 
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Table 1   Transitions between long term job (LTJ), short term job (STJ), unemployment (U) and other 
states 
 Current State (T) 
Previous 
State (T-1) 
0.Other 1.U 2.STJ 3.LTJ Total 
 % % % % % 
0.Other 96.8 2.0 0.6 0.6 100.0 
1.U 24.5 62.1 9.3 4.2 100.0 
2.STJ 8.9 9.0 76.6 5.6 100.0 
3.LTJ 1.9 0.9 0.3 96.9 100.0 
Total 63.6 5.0 3.8 27.7 100.0 
Source: LFS 2010. Authors’ calculations 
 
The transitions in table 1 reflect changes in labour market states. They do not 
necessarily capture changes between employers. If workers change employer, but still have 
the same type of contract, no transition is recorded in table 1. This means that the mean 
duration of STJ taken from table 1 is greater than the typical mean contract duration.  
 2.2. Employment security and quality 
According to the 2010 European Survey on Working Conditions (ESWC), workers in 
STJ declare less often that they are satisfied with their working conditions (70 per cent vs. 
78 per cent) though the satisfaction gap may appear smaller than expected.
8
 This difference 
remains significant when controlling for the age, gender and level of education of the 
workers.  
This difference in satisfaction may be related to the difference in earnings between 
STJ and LTJ workers. Earnings of STJ workers are structurally lower because their 
probability of unemployment is higher and by nature their employment spells shorter. 
According to the ESWC, 52 per cent of STJ workers (vs. 41 per cent) declare that they are 
not well paid for their work.  
This difference in job satisfaction may also be caused by the fact that STJ workers 
often move from job to job or to unemployment. STJ workers often declare in the ESWC 
that they “might lose their job in the next 6 months” (41 per cent vs. 7 per cent of LTJ 
workers). The lack of job security prevents STJ workers from building their career. 21 per 
cent (vs. 34 per cent of LTJ workers) declare that they have “good prospects for career 
advancement”. The mobility of STJ workers prevents them from developing their social 
network in their workplace. 57 per cent of STJ workers (vs. 72 per cent of LTJ workers) 
declare that they “have good friends at work”. All these dimensions may contribute to the 
lower level of job satisfaction of STJ workers. 
 
8
 This point is discussed in Section 5.1. 
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In addition firms invest less in STJ workers. Although STJ workers feel more often 
than LTJ workers that they would need further training to cope well with their duties (14 
per cent vs. 8 per cent), firms pay less on STJ workers’ trainings: 14 per cent of STJ 
workers (vs. 29 per cent) declare that they have done a “training paid for or provided by 
their employer” over the past 12 months. Again those differences remain significant when 
controlling for the age, gender and level of education of the workers.  To compensate for 
this lack of firms’ investment, STJ workers more often learn through co-workers and 
supervisors (31 per cent vs. 26 per cent) or pay directly further training (6 per cent vs. 2 per 
cent).   
 2.3. Trends in stocks and flows 
During the 90s, there was a steady increase in the share of STJ. Then the importance 
of STJ has been quite stable since 1999. Similar trends are found in the public sector (see 
Fabre 2006). Figure 2 shows that the share of STJ has increased from 5 per cent in 1990 to 
11 per cent in the late 90s. This increase cannot be linked to major reforms of the law on 
STJ in the 90s (though it could be the long term effect of the 80s reforms). If anything, the 
Law made STJ more stringent in 1990 (see the relevant section below). It could be linked to 
the evolution of the relative stringency of EPL between STJ and LTJ, both due to the 
legislation and case law.  
Figure 2   The share of STJ in the French private sector  
 
Source: LFS. Authors’ calculations 
The increase in the aggregate stock of STJ workers can be explained by the increase in 
the share of STJ in total inflows from unemployment to employment over the period, while 
the difference in the probability to enter unemployment from STJ and LTJ and the 
upgrading probability from STJ to LTJ stayed constant over the period (figures 3, 4 and 5). 
It is expected that the discrepancy in outflows probability remains constant over the period 
because this difference is structural and reflects the EPL gap between the two types of 
contracts (figure 4). The fact that the upgrading probability does not evolve over the period 
is less expected (figure 5). For example, changes in the firms’ need for screening workers 
(one of the purposes of STJ) could have pushed upward or downward the upgrading 
probability.  
 6 
 
Figure 3   Transition rates from unemployment to employment by contracts type 
 
 
Source: LFS. Authors’ calculations 
 
 
Figure 4  Transition rates from employment to unemployment by contracts type 
 
Source: LFS. Authors’ calculations 
 
 7 
 
Figure 5  Employment-employment transition 
 
Source: LFS. Authors’ calculations 
   
Alternatively, the increase in the share of STJ can be explained by the progressive 
replacement of senior LTJ workers by young workers starting their careers with STJ (see 
figure a in the appendix). 
Note that, while STJ still represent a minority of the employment stock in 2010, these 
trends have led to the prevalence of STJ flows in total flows. The share of STJ in total 
inflows from unemployment to employment is around 69 per cent in 2010. The share of 
workers formerly with STJ in total outflows from employment to unemployment is around 
58 per cent in 2010. 
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 2.4. Dualism in turbulent times 
Figure 6 below illustrates how the French labour market has recently coped with the 
crisis. It is straightforward to remark that the main part of fluctuations in employment 
inflows is due to inflows into temporary jobs.  
Figure 6    Number of inflows into employment per quarter (in thousands) in the private non 
agricultural sector. Deviations with respect to trend from quarterly (HP filtered) 
data over the period 2000q1 to 2012q2. 
 
Sources: ACOSS-DUE and DARES and authors’ calculations  
 
In France over the period 2000q1-2012q2, changes in total employment inflow are 
mainly driven by temporary jobs. The average deviation between the number of entries and 
its trend is seven times larger for temporary jobs than for permanent jobs. In particular, one 
may observe that at the beginning of the recession that started in 2008, there is a strong 
drop of entries into temporary jobs, much larger than the drop of entries in permanent jobs. 
As the previous figure shows, an overwhelming majority of the adjustment in the 
inflows into employment transits through temporary jobs. This fact raises an inescapable 
question: who bears the cost of the business cycle? We have already shown that temporary 
jobs are much more a concern for the young workers. Hence in a segmented labour market, 
it might be expected that employment adjustment is more drastic among the youths than 
among the prime-age workers. Accordingly, the unemployment rate is likely to be more 
volatile for young people. Figure 7 below plots the unemployment rate for different age 
groups over the period 1990-2010 in France.  
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Figure 7  Unemployment rates by age in France 
 
Source: OECD. 
 
 
As expected, it appears that the unemployment rate for the youths aged between 15 
and 24 is much more volatile than the unemployment rate for the prime-age and senior 
workers. This is confirmed by a recent study by Kawaguchi and Murao (2012). The authors 
show that there is a considerable heterogeneity in the volatility of age-specific 
unemployment rates across OECD countries. A core result of their study is that stricter EPL 
amplifies the effect of the cyclical unemployment rate on youths’ unemployment rate. Put 
differently, the burden of labour market adjustments is disproportionately shifted onto the 
shoulder of the youths in countries with stricter EPL.  
In the view of the forgoing analysis, it is irrefutable that the crisis has shown the limits 
of reforms at the margin. Another area of concern is hence linked to the reforms that may 
be implemented in the midst of a crisis. In this respect active labour market policies may be 
of valuable help especially for young people as it has been recently put to the fore by a 
number of authors (see e.g. Forslund, Fredriksson and Vikström, 2011, Andersen and 
Svarer, 2012).  
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3. Institutional background 
3.1. General principles  
The general principle governing labour relations is described in the article L. 1221-2 
of the French labour code which stipulates that the normal and general labour contract 
between a firm and a worker is the permanent or open-ended contract
9
 (CDI). From this 
standpoint, all other contracts may therefore be seen as atypical or non-conventional. 
Among these atypical contracts, the most common type of contract is the fixed-
duration/short term contract (CDD) that roughly accounts for 12 per cent of total 
employment.  
First introduced in 1979, this type of contract is tightly regulated by the French labour 
code (see articles L. 1241-1 to L. 1248-11) and is primarily intended to be used in particular 
cases (see below). The legislation associated with this type of contract is complex and 
somehow deliberately deterrent.    
In its actual form the recourse to CDD is framed by the reform undertaken in 1990 (N. 
90-613 – July 1990) that has restricted the use of temporary contracts. A few exceptions 
have been however introduced since then. As a general principle, at least in the spirit of the 
law, the recourse to CDD should remain exceptional. The article L. 1242-2 specifies the 
reasons for use of temporary contracts. They can be offered in the following cases: 
-  Replacement of a worker who is absent whatever the reason (e.g. sick leave, 
maternity leave, vacations, on leave…). It is however strictly forbidden to hire a 
worker on STJ to replace a worker on strike, to perform hazardous work or to fill a 
position that has been made redundant for less than six months. 
- Temporary increase in the activity of the firm (e.g. to serve an export market, to 
achieve some urgent tasks…). 
- Activities that are by nature seasonal (e.g. Christmas sales, tourism…). 
The general principles governing the CDD specify that the contract can be renewed 
two times at most and that the maximum cumulative duration of successive contracts 
should not exceed 18 months.
10
  In most cases, the CDD opens right to severance payments. 
Beyond the general rules, noticeable exceptions are worth mentioning here.  
First, the recourse to temporary contracts can be more flexible for some jobs in some 
particular sectors where the contract is said to be customary.  In this case, the contract is 
said to be a “Contrat d’usage” and is by nature temporary due to the fact that it is 
customary not to hire people on permanent contract for the task to be accomplished (e.g. 
 
9
 The article L. 1221-2 of the French labour code stipulates that « La forme normale et générale de 
la relation de travail est le contrat à durée indéterminée».   
10
 9 months if it concerns an urgent task to be undertaken, 24 months if it concerns an exceptional 
export order or if the contract is executed abroad. In some cases (e.g. replacement of a worker on 
extended sick leave), the length of the temporary contract can be undetermined. In this case the 
contract must specify a minimum duration.  
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moving or polls).
11
 This type of contract may be renewed at will and does not qualify for 
severance payments.  
Second, particular dispositions have been introduced for the workers aged 57+ (“CDD 
senior”) in 2006. This contract is conceived to ease the reintegration into work of the older 
workers. The maximal duration of the contract is 18 months. It can be renewed only one 
time and the cumulative duration of the contract cannot exceed 36 months.  
Finally, following the modernization act of the labour market
12
 in 2008, a special type 
of contract (“CDD à objet défini”) has been introduced. This type of contract is mostly 
intended for white collar/skilled workers and specifies a particular task/assignment to be 
accomplished. The minimal duration of the contract is 18 months and the maximal duration 
cannot exceed 36 months. This type of contract cannot be renewed. 
 
 3.2.  The French Employment protection legislation 
3.2.1. A brief overview 
According to the OECD indicators, the employment protection legislation (EPL) in 
France is particularly stringent. On a scale from 0 (least restrictions) to 6 (most 
restrictions), the overall EPL indicator for France in 2008 is worth 3.05 whereas the 
average for OECD countries is equal to 1.94. This indicator can be examined in more detail 
by separating permanent and temporary contracts. For the same time period, EPL indexes 
are worth 3
13
 and 4
14
 for permanent and temporary contracts respectively whereas the 
OECD averages are 2.11 for the former and 1.77 for the latter. 
Most European continental countries have some stringent procedural requirements for 
dismissals. In France, as a general principle, dismissals must be justified by a serious and 
genuine cause (“cause réelle et sérieuse”, see articles L. 1232-1 and L. 1233-2 from the 
French labour code). Since the introduction of this requirement in 1973 and following the 
continuous surge in unemployment, the legislation and the case law have steadily 
strengthened the control, and restricted the possibility to dismiss workers for economic 
reasons.  Despite the fact that individual dismissals for economic reasons do not require 
outside approval or notification, this procedure carries a lot of uncertainty. The Gordian 
knot stems from a restrictive definition of the serious and genuine cause whose formulation 
 
11
 An exhaustive list of the sectors concerned with this type of contract is given by the decree D. 
1242-1 of the French labor code. This type of contract may be used in the following main sectors: 
forestry, naval repair, moving, hospitality, spectacle, cultural activities, audiovisual, edition, movie 
industry, teaching, polls, music publishing, leisure centres and holiday camps, storage of meat, 
professional sport, construction work conducted abroad, cooperation and engineering and technical 
assistance and research conducted abroad.   
12
 « Loi portant modernisation du marché du travail » from the Fillon (right-wing) government. 
13
 This score approximates the difficulty of dismissal for permanent contracts and is a weighted 
average of several sub-indicators, including the definition of justified or unfair dismissal, length of 
trial period, compensation following unfair dismissal and possibility of reinstatement following 
unfair dismissal.  See: www.oecd.org/employment/protection 
14
 This score approximates the stringency of the legislation for temporary contracts and is a weighted 
average of several sub-indicators, including the valid cases for use of fixed-term contracts, maximum 
number of successive fixed-term contracts and maximum cumulated duration of successive fixed-
term contracts. See: www.oecd.org/employment/protection  
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is fuzzy and likely to initiate long and costly judicial proceedings.
15
 Quoting Cahuc (2012) : 
“French judges have developed jurisprudence that forbids companies from firing 
employees to improve their competitiveness; they can only fire employees to safeguard their 
competitiveness. Nevertheless, the notion of economic dismissal – based on this distinction 
between safeguarding competitiveness (considered by jurisprudence as a real and serious 
cause of dismissal) and improving competitiveness (not considered as a valid motive for 
dismissal) – is particularly difficult to interpret.”16 In case of a collective dismissal17 
procedural requirements are more complex and require for instance written notification to 
public administration
18
 as well as its advisory opinion. On top of that, it is of the firms’ 
responsibility to put in place redeployment measures for the workers that have been laid-
off.  
3.2.2. Enforcement 
As we have seen, France is among the countries where EPL is the most stringent. A 
side effect of this stringency is to produce a large amount of legal procedures related to 
labour disputes. The number of legal procedures has increased dramatically since the mid-
95 (Dares, 2006). Those disputes are mainly brought to the “prud’hommes” which is the 
relevant jurisdiction to solve labour conflicts.
19
 On average, about 90 per cent of the cases 
brought to the court are related to the termination of a temporary or an open-ended contract 
(Dares, 2006), and about 25 per cent of dismissed workers disputes the legitimacy of their 
layoffs each year (Fraisse, Kramarz, Prost, 2011). The legal procedure is costly, complex 
and time-consuming. For instance, in 2011 the average duration to solve a case was of 
about 11 months and the court rules in favor of the workers in most cases (the rate is close 
from 75 per cent, see Fraisse et al. 2011).  
Using data from the public employment service (PES) over the period 1995-2012, 
figure 8 represents the flows of entries into unemployment for workers with permanent –
open ended- contracts.    
 
15
 See Cahuc and Carcillo (2007) for more details.  
16
 See e.g. Cahuc and Kramarz (2004), Cahuc and Carcillo (2007) or Ray (2012) for further details 
on the French jurisprudence related to economic dismissals.  
17
 The French labour code distinguishes two collective dismissal procedures: In the first case, firms 
that fire 10 or more employees over a 30-day period are concerned; In the second case, firms that fire 
less than 10 employees over a 30-day period are concerned.  
18
 Notification must be provided to DDTE (“Direction Départementale du Travail et de l’Emploi”). 
See e.g.  Cahuc and Carcillo (2007) for further details. 
19
 In 2011, 205321 cases have been solved by the 210 labour courts (“conseils des prud’hommes”) 
spread all over the French territory. For further details see: 
http://www.justice.gouv.fr/art_pix/chiffres_cles_2012_20121108.pdf  
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Figure 8  Number of entries into registered unemployment (thousands per month) 
 
Source: Pôle-Emploi 
 
It appears that over the period, the number of monthly layoffs for economic reasons 
have steadily decreased from about 40,000 in 1995 to 13,500 in 2012 whereas layoffs for 
other reasons have expanded by about 50 per cent and quits have remained remarkably 
stable. 
These figures suggest that firms circumvent the law to avoid the complexity and the 
uncertainty associated with the current dismissal requirements. Note also that the 
downward trend observed since 2008 is concomitant with the introduction of a new 
dismissal modality. 
As a matter of fact, a new dismissal modality has been introduced in 2008. The 
separation between the firm and the worker is made by mutual consent (“rupture 
conventionnelle”)20 and this introduction has helped to obscure the contours of the French 
employment protection legislation. As can be seen on figure 9, this modality has increased 
substantially in scale during the recent period and greatly exceeds layoffs for economic 
reasons. It is also remarkable that the administrative refusal rate has steadily decreased to 
reach a low 5 per cent by the end of 2012. From this point of view, it seems likely that the 
“rupture conventionnelle” has provided incentives to the firms and to the workers to 
circumvent the burden of the legislation.  
 
20
 See the Appendix for a detailed description of this new modality. 
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Figure 9  Monthly number of separations by mutual consent (“Rupture conventionnelle”) and layoff for 
economic reasons (left axis), and refusal rate (right axis) 
 
Source: DARES 
 
Hence, it appears that there is a misuse of legislation on common dismissal procedures 
for permanent contracts. To complete this less than flattering portrayal of the legislation, it 
must be mentioned that the introduction of numerous exceptions
21
 on the use of temporary 
contracts has considerably weakened their regulations and has created more favourable 
conditions for abuse.  
The increasing involvement of the judicial system and its propensity to second guess 
firms’ layoff decisions have been criticized by a number of authors (See e.g. Blanchard and 
Tirole, 2003, Cahuc and Kramarz, 2005 or Cahuc and Carcillo, 2007). In addition, it has 
been pointed out that workers with permanent contracts may only be superficially 
protected, as indicated by the very few fair or justified dismissals in job destruction flows 
(Boeri, Bertola and Cazes, 2002, Cahuc and Kramarz, 2005, Cahuc and Carcillo, 2007). 
 
 
21
 See Section 4.1. for an overview.  
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3.2.3. Summary characteristics of the legislation  
We provide below for the two types of contracts the main characteristics of the 
legislation. A more detailed description can be found in the ILO Employment protection 
legislation data base (EPLex).
22
 
Table 2   Legislation governing permanent contracts (CDI) and individual dismissals 
  
Trial period 
Dismissal 
(economic reasons)  
Notice period Severance pay 
Perm. 
Contracts 
Max 8 months. The 
trial period is 
renewable once if 
this is stipulated in 
the labour contract.  
The period is skill 
dependent ranging 
from 2 months for 
blue collar workers 
to 4 months for 
white collar workers 
(art. L. 1221-19). 
Dismissal for 
economic reasons 
can occur at any 
time provided that 
the reason is serious 
and genuine (art. L. 
1232-1) and that the 
worker has received 
a written formal 
notification (art. L. 
1232-6).  
Min 2 months if 
the tenure is 
greater or equal 
to 2 years, 1 
month 
otherwise (art. 
L. 1234-1). 
A worker is eligible to 
a severance pay after 
tenure of at least 1 
year (art. L 1234-9). 
The statutory 
minimum is 1/5 of 
monthly wage per year 
of seniority. A 
premium of 2/15 of 
monthly wage is added 
for all years of 
seniority beyond 10 
years.
23
 
 
Table 3  Legislation governing temporary contracts (CDD) 
 Trial period Dismissal Severance pay 
Temp. 
contracts 
Max 1 month if the 
contract exceeds 6 
months, 15 days 
otherwise. The trial 
period is renewable 
once (art. L. 1242-10). 
Dismissal for 
economic reason 
cannot occur before 
the expiration date of 
the contract (art. L. 
1243-1). 
A worker is eligible to a 
severance pay (“prime de 
précarité”) at the expiration of the 
contract when the contract is not 
renewed or transformed into a 
permanent contract (art. L. 1243-
8). The statutory minimum is 
10% of the gross wage over the 
entire duration of the contract. 
Temporary contracts are often perceived as dramatically flexible. However, an 
important feature of EPL is often neglected both in policy oriented reports and in the 
academic literature.
24
 In most countries, it is extremely difficult to dismiss temporary 
 
22
 See http://www.ilo.org/dyn/terminate/termmain. For an exhaustive presentation, see the French 
labour code available at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr. 
 
23
 For instance, for a worker with a tenure of 15 years, the minimum severance pay amounts to 
(1/5*15) + (2/15*5) = 3.67 months of wages. 
24
 Noteworthy exceptions in the literature are Bentolila, Cahuc, Dolado and Le Barbanchon (2012), 
Cahuc, Charlot and Malherbet (2012), and Charlot and Malherbet (2012). The model developed in 
Appendix will explicitly take account of this feature. 
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workers before the date of termination of the contract stipulated when the job starts.  For 
instance in France, the article L. 1243-1 of the labour code stipulates that temporary 
contracts cannot be terminated before their expiration date. There are exceptions to this 
general rule. Employers can only dismiss fixed-term workers if there is a credible valid 
reason which makes the continuation of employment unacceptable (e.g. misbehaviour of 
the worker). In addition an employee can quit if he finds an open-ended contract. 
 
 3.3. Institutional trends over the period 1990-2008 
As emphasized by Boeri (2011), European labour market institutions have been 
subject to much activism over the last 20 years. As regards employment protection, figure 
10 below shows that, over the period 1985-2008, a majority of countries has changed their 
employment protection strictness. At first sight, it may appear that French institutions have 
been subject to less activism than other countries as can be inferred from the relative 
position of the country from the 45 degree line. A thorough analysis shows however that 
France is no exception (see table 4 below).  
Figure 10  The evolution of EPL strictness over the period 1985-2008. Countries below the 45 degree 
line are those that have experienced a decrease in EPL stringency 
 
Source: OECD (2008) 
 
Nevertheless, this activism is particular to the extent that it has made labour market 
more flexible at the margin by facilitating the recourse to temporary jobs without actually 
changing the protection of permanent jobs. Figure 11 below illustrates this fact. It 
represents the evolution of the average EPL strictness over the period 1990-2008 computed 
as the average of the OECD EPL indicators for permanent and temporary jobs in European 
countries. 
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Figure 11  Evolution of the average EPL strictness for permanent and temporary jobs in European 
countries 
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Source: OECD (2008) 
 
It can be remarked that over that period of time, the protection of permanent jobs has 
remained almost stable whereas the protection of temporary jobs has been sharply reduced, 
falling from 2.96 in 1990 to 1.89 in 2008. 
As in many European countries, a vast majority of the reforms undertaken in France 
since the 1990’s have fostered two-tier systems. Precisely, the reform of labour market 
institutions has taken place mainly through a series of marginal reforms that liberalized the 
use of fixed-term and/or non-standard employment contracts.  
The table below presents the main reforms for EPL in France for both permanent and 
temporary contracts.
25
 The methodology follows closely Boeri (2011). A positive sign in 
the column flexibility indicates that the reform has increased labour market flexibility 
whereas a negative sign indicates the reverse. 
 
25
 Table is built using the SRDB-IZA Social Reforms Database for the period 1990-2007 available at 
http://www.frdb.org/  and information available at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/ for the period 
2008-2012. 
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Table 4  Main institutional changes over the period 1990-2012 
Law/Bill Date Topics Flexibility 
90-613 12-july-1990 Restore the exhaustive list of situations when the use of 
temporary contracts is authorized. 
(-) 
92-722 29-july-1992 Individual dismissals - Procedural obligations for 
permanent contracts are strengthened. 
(-) 
2002-73
26
 17-january-
2002 
Increase restrictions on the use of temporary contracts and 
increase regulations on collective redundancies.  
(-) 
2003-6 3-january-2003 The new law suspended nine redundancy-related articles 
of the previous law introduced in 2002. 
(+) 
2005-843 26-July-2005 Increase restrictions on the use of temporary contracts in 
the public sector. 
(-) 
2005-893 26-July-2005 Introduction of new type of contracts (“Contrat Nouvel 
Embauche - CNE”) for the firms with less than 20 
workers. 
(+) 
2006-1070 28-August-
2006 
Introduction of a new type of temporary contracts for the 
workers aged 57+ (“CDD Senior”) (see above). Gradual 
removal of the “Delalande contribution”, a kind of 
experience-rated layoff tax for workers aged 50+. 
(+) 
2008-596
27
 25-June-2008 Introduction of a new type of temporary contracts for 
white collar/skilled workers (“Contrat à objet défini”). 
Abrogation of the CNE introduced in 2005. Introduction 
of a new dismissal modality by mutual consent for open-
ended contracts (“Rupture conventionnelle”). 
(+)/(-) 
 
Temporary contracts have been first introduced on the French labour market in 1979 
(L. 79-11 – January 1979). Since then a considerable number of reforms have been 
undertaken mostly focused on temporary employment, i.e. the so called flexibility at the 
margin, favouring the status quo for workers employed on permanent –open-ended- 
contracts. From this perspective, the French labour market has been subject to a 
considerable activism. The Table 4 above does not convey a clear-cut message on how the 
main institutional changes have shaped labour market segmentation. However a finer-
grained analysis that encompasses the case law as well as the enforcement of the law 
indicates that the EPL differential between permanent and temporary contracts has 
increased. As a consequence, the spread of temporary jobs has been fostered since the 
beginning of the 90s (see figure 2). 
 
 
26
 « Loi de modernisation sociale » from the Jospin (left-wing) government.  
27
 « Loi portant modernisation du marché du travail » from the Fillon (right-wing) government. 
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4. What do we know (or not) on the effects of 
two-tier systems on labour market 
outcomes? 
In this section, we investigate the effects of labour market dualism on labour market 
outcomes with a particular emphasis on the quality of jobs. For this purpose, we proceed as 
follows. First, we develop a search and matching model in the spirit of Mortensen and 
Pissarides (1994) that borrows from the recent works by Bentolila et al. (2012), Cahuc et al. 
(2012) and Charlot and Malherbet (2013). The main objective here is to illustrate how 
changes in policies affect various labour market outcomes. An originality of our approach 
is to account for an important feature of EPL which have been neglected so far, i.e. the fact 
that temporary contracts cannot be terminated before their expiration date. For editorial 
convenience, the main characteristics of the model are briefly presented in the summary 
box below. Technical and calibration details are reported in the appendix. Second, we 
complement the analysis with the most recent advances in the theoretical and empirical 
literature dealing with labour market segmentation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A search and matching model of a segmented labour market 
 
The search and matching model developed borrows from Bentolila et al. (2012), 
Cahuc et al. (2012), and Charlot and Malherbet (2013). The model incorporates the 
main characteristics of the French labor market. A summary of relevant technical 
details is reported in the appendix and we refer the interested reader to the above 
mentioned articles. 
There are matching frictions on the labour market. The key insight is that bilateral 
matching is an uncoordinated and time consuming activity that is costly for both firms 
and workers.  
There are two types of contracts: temporary and permanent. Permanent contracts are 
the regular type of contracts and do not stipulate any pre-determined duration. They 
are protected by dismissal costs paid by firms. These costs are not transferable to the 
workers and therefore consist in red-tape and legal costs rather than severance 
payments. Temporary contracts stipulate a fixed duration and are not renewable. An 
originality of our approach is to account for an important institutional feature which 
has been neglected by the literature so far: temporary contract cannot be terminated 
before their expiration date. At their date of termination, temporary jobs can be either 
destroyed at zero cost or transformed into permanent jobs. Trying to mimic realistic 
wage bargaining procedures, we assume that wage in permanent jobs are renegotiated 
by mutual agreement whereas they are fixed in temporary jobs until the jobs expire. 
Workers are equally productive in both contracts (ex ante). 
Results presented in the core of the text originate from simulation exercises. The main 
objective here is qualitative rather than quantitative though the order of magnitude is 
relevant for the French labour market.  We use exogenous variation in policy 
parameters (e.g. EPL strictness on open-ended contract, easiness to create 
temporary jobs) to illustrate various labour market outcomes. 
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 4.1. Labour market dynamics 
The extensive recourse to short term jobs (STJ) is a striking feature of labour markets 
with stringent employment protection. In OECD countries, this type of contract accounts 
for 10 to 30 per cent of total employment (stock) and for a substantial proportion of new 
hires (flows) reaching up to 90 per cent in countries like Spain. As the scatter plot below 
illustrates, the share of STJ is positively correlated with the strictness of employment 
protection. However and as it has been advocated by a number of authors (see e.g. Bentolila 
et al., 2012), it is first and foremost the EPL gap between the two types of contracts that 
drives the share of STJ. It is therefore particularly important to decompose the EPL index 
into STJ and LTJ when comparing countries with high overall EPL, such as France and 
Spain (see Bentolila et al. 2012).   
Figure 12  The relation between the share of STJ and EPL strictness (permanent employment) 
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Plausible explanation for this result stems from the facts that EPL makes firm more 
reluctant to hire worker on open-ended contracts and more demanding to convert STJ into 
long term jobs (LTJ). It has long been recognized by the literature that two-tier systems 
affect labour market dynamics. As a matter of fact, fostering the creation of STJ promotes 
job creation but also increases jobs destruction, leading to an ambiguous effect on 
unemployment.  
Making use of the model developed in the appendix, the graph below shows how EPL 
shapes labour market dynamics in a two-tier country like France when we vary the EPL for 
permanent jobs. In our model, this is equivalent to a change in the EPL gap between 
permanent and temporary jobs.  
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Figure 13  Effects of a rise in EPL strictness for permanent jobs on labour market dynamics 
 
 
EPL strictness on LTJ fosters labour hoarding for permanent jobs meaning that the 
average employment spell on open-ended contracts increases. A key implication of the 
model is that the transformation rate of temporary jobs into permanent jobs decreases with 
the strictness of EPL. As a corollary, churning for temporary jobs intensifies with EPL. 
These results are confirmed by the empirical literature (see OECD 2002 or Boeri 2011). It 
has been shown for instance that a non-negligible fraction of temporary jobs can be 
transformed into permanent jobs in some countries with low EPL such as the UK, where 
the transformation rate is about 50 percent, while it is much lower in countries with more 
stringent EPL such as France, where the same rate is below 15 percent.  
Two-tier systems affect the level and the composition of labour market flows and 
generate excess of labour turnover. For instance, Cahuc et al. (2012) show that an increase 
in EPL strictness induces a strong excess of labour turnover, which is detrimental to 
temporary workers whose expected job duration becomes shorter. However it has a very 
limited impact on aggregate employment. This limited impact stems from two 
counteracting effects, a strong decrease in the number of permanent jobs and a strong 
increase in the number of temporary jobs. This results in large reallocation effects 
suggesting a large substitutability between the two types of contracts.
28
 
To some extent dual labour markets may be beneficial to unemployed workers. First, 
temporary jobs may be seen as a port of entry into employment and therefore may act as 
“stepping-stones” to permanent employment. Second, by fostering job creations, they are 
likely to shorten unemployment duration.  
Making use of the model developed in the appendix, the graph below depicts how an 
increase in the flexibility at the margin (-- the easiness with which temporary jobs are 
created --) affects unemployment duration.  
 
28
 See among others Booth et al. (2002), Centeno and Novo (2012), and Cappellari, Dell’Aringa and 
Leonardi (2012).  
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Figure 14  Effects of the easiness to create temporary jobs on the duration of unemployment 
 
 It follows that a more flexible regulation on temporary jobs increases the frequency 
with which job-worker matches are terminated and decreases unemployment duration. 
Similar results are found in e.g. Cahuc and Postel-Vinay (2002) and are confirmed in recent 
empirical studies (see e.g. Graaf-Zijl, van den Berg and Heyma, 2011). The magnitude of 
the effect is however questioned. In the particular case of France, Blanchard and Landier 
(2002) conclude using French LFS over the period 1983-2000, that labour market reforms 
have strongly increased labour turnover without a substantial reduction in unemployment 
duration.   
Another recurring issue which has been raised with dual labour markets is to know 
whether temporary jobs act as stepping-stones or as dead-ends following the terminology 
introduced by Booth et al. (2002). There are now many studies that assess the occurrence of 
these two phenomena using longitudinal data. As often with this type of evaluation, their 
conclusions are rather mixed.
29
 In a nutshell, the spread of temporary jobs generally acts as 
a stepping-stone for men and skilled workers and leads to dead-ends for women and school-
leavers.
30
  More generally the individual characteristics (observed and unobserved) are key 
determinants to assess whether temporary jobs promote workers toward permanent 
contracts or trap them in precarious jobs. In the particular case of France, a recent study by 
Blasco and Givord (2010) evaluates how temporary jobs affect the professional career of 
young workers using data from the Training and Occupational Skill
31
 survey in 2003. Their 
estimates show a strong influence of individual characteristics on transitions and that the 
initial type of contracts may have long-term effect on the workers’ career. In particular, the 
authors show that temporary jobs lead more often to unemployment and/or inactivity than 
to permanent jobs. It follows that the so called stepping-stone effect is rather weak; a 
conclusion also shared by Givord and Wilner (2009) in another empirical evaluation using 
French data. 
 
29
 See among others Booth et al. (2002) for UK, Bruno et al. (2012) for Italy, Garcia-Pérez and 
Munoz-Bullon (2011) for Spain, Graaf-Zilj et al. (2011) for the Netherlands.  
30
 Note however that there is a considerable heterogeneity between countries; see e.g. Bruno et al. 
(2012) for a more detailed discussion.  
31
 Enquête “Formation et Qualification Professionnelle (FQP)”.   
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 4.2. Wage inequality 
Two-tier systems increase wage inequality between workers employed on different 
types of contract. Making use of the model developed in the appendix, the figure below 
shows how the EPL gap for permanent jobs affects the wage premium on permanent 
contracts.  
Figure 15  Effects of a rise of EPL strictness for permanent jobs on the wage premium 
 
 
As can be inferred from the figure, temporary jobs pay on average lower wages than 
permanent jobs for workers with the same characteristics. There are two reasons for this 
result. First, the duration of temporary jobs is shorter than that of permanent jobs. This 
induces a lower average surplus for temporary jobs. Second, the impossibility to terminate 
contracts before their date of termination implies that in some cases employers pay positive 
wages to unproductive temporary workers. The prediction of the model is supported by 
empirical evidence that temporary workers get lower wages than permanent workers 
controlling for a large set of observable characteristics. In country specific estimates for 
instance, Booth et al. (2002) find that temporary workers in Britain earn less than 
permanent workers with a wage premium of about 8.9 per cent for men and 6 per cent for 
women. Hagen (2002) finds an even larger gap of about 23 percent in Germany, controlling 
for selection on unobservable characteristics, while more recently Pfeifer (2012) finds a 
smaller premium of about 10 per cent still for Germany.  
Using micro-data from the ECHP
32
 and EUSILC,
33
 Boeri (2011) estimates the 
monthly wage premium on permanent contracts for 15 European countries. The results are 
reported in the table below.  
 
32
 European Community Household Panel. 
33
 European Union Survey on Income and Living Condition. 
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Table 5  Wage premium for permanent contracts for 15 European countries. Legend: (***) significant at 99 
per cent, (**) significant at 95 per cent, (*) significant at 90 per cent 
Country Premium (%) Country Premium (%) 
Austria  20.1 (***) Italy  24.1 (***) 
Belgium  13.9 (***) Luxembourg  27.6 (***) 
Denmark  17.7 (***) Netherlands  35.4 (***) 
Finland  19.0 (***) Portugal  15.8 (***) 
France  28.9 (***) Spain  16.9 (***) 
Germany  26.6 (***) Sweden  44.7 (***) 
Greece  20.2 (***) United Kingdom  6.5 (*) 
Ireland  17.8 (**)     
Source: Boeri (2011) 
 
The wage premium ranges from a low 6.5 per cent in the UK to a large 44.7 per cent 
in Sweden. By and large, empirical evidence points to a substantial wage premium for 
permanent contracts even if the estimates may significantly differ from one study to the 
other.  
 4.3. Human capital 
 Dualism does not only affect labour turnover and wage inequality. It may also be 
detrimental to human capital accumulation. As shown above, two-tier labour markets 
introduce counteracting effects on labour turnover, as they reduce job destruction for 
permanent jobs but increase churning for temporary jobs. Education investments are related 
to labour turnover and both workers and firms may react to change in regulations. First, the 
spread of temporary jobs may induce individuals to modify their human capital investments 
due to the fact that the return to schooling is lower in an environment characterized by job 
instability. Second, the very nature of temporary jobs may encourage firms to provide less 
firm-sponsored training because the instability of the employment relationship is likely to 
prevent firms to reap the benefit of their investment. In this section, we examine these two 
aspects of dual labour markets. 
Dual labour markets affect initial education investments. To understand this point, our 
analysis bears on a slightly modified version of the model presented in the appendix.
34
 The 
graph below depicts the effect of EPL strictness on education investments in two different 
labour markets: one without temporary jobs (panel a) and one with temporary jobs (panel 
b). 
 
34
 See Charlot and Malherbet (2013) for a complete and detailed analysis.  
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Figure 16  Education effort in a labour market without temporary jobs (panel a) and in a dual 
labour market (panel b) 
 
 
Strikingly, the impact of EPL strictness on educational investments depends on the 
type of labour market:  Educational investments increase with EPL strictness when there is 
only one type of labour contract and decrease with EPL strictness in a two-tier labour 
market. The intuition for this result goes as follows. In panel a, the increase in EPL 
strictness by fostering labour hoarding makes the employment relationship more stable and 
thus raises the return to education. This is the beneficial effect of EPL. In panel b, the 
beneficial effect of EPL on the job destruction for permanent jobs is offset by the rise in 
labour turnover for temporary jobs, as their transformation rate into permanent jobs is lower 
when EPL strictness increases. This effect is detrimental to educational investments.   
Two-tier labour markets do not only affect the return to schooling. They are also likely 
to alter the provision of firms’ sponsored-training to temporary workers. As a matter of 
fact, firms have little incentive to train their workers on temporary contracts due to the lack 
of a sustainable relationship between the firm and the worker. This prediction is confirmed 
by a number of empirical evidence. For instance, Albert, Garcia-Serrano and Hernanz 
(2005) using Spanish data
35
 show that workers on temporary contracts are less likely to be 
hired by training firms. In addition, when these workers are lucky enough to be hired by a 
training firm, the probability that they get trained is significantly lower compared to 
workers hired on permanent contracts.
36
         
 
 
35
 The authors use the “Working Condition Survey” (ECVT), a yearly survey created by the Spanish 
Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs.  
36
 Similar conclusions are reached by Booth et al. (2002) for the UK or Picchio and van Ours (2011) 
for the Netherlands.  
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 4.4. Other aspects  
Dual labour markets are likely to affect individuals in many other dimensions that the 
ones highlighted above such as job satisfaction, social integration and health. 
Two-tier systems have produced a divided labour market with an unequal repartition 
of risk between workers. Essentially some workers do not bear any risks (typically workers 
on permanent contracts with a low layoff probability) while some bear many risks 
(typically workers on temporary/atypical contracts with a high churning rate). The 
stringency of EPL on permanent contracts does not however protect workers against a 
feeling of insecurity and precariousness (see e.g. Clark and Postel-Vinay, 2005, Postel-
Vinay and Saint Martin, 2005).  The intuition for this result goes as follows: the complexity 
and the strictness of EPL favour the spread of temporary jobs that in turn increases the 
volatility of the labour market and decreases labour mobility from temporary to permanent 
employment (see section 4.1.). As a consequence, workers tend to feel more insecure (see 
e.g. Boeri and Garibaldi, 2007). In addition, the complexity of the law creates risks of 
abuses and favours the circumvention of legislation by tacit or legal arrangements at the 
expense of the more precarious and fragile workers (see e.g. Cahuc and Kramarz, 2005).  
 Following Booth et al. (2002), a number of recent studies have focussed on the link 
between temporary jobs and job satisfaction (see Bardasi and Francesconi, 2004, Origo and 
Pagani, 2009, or de Graaf-Zijl, 2012). The main results can be summarized as follows: 
there does not necessarily seem to be a significant difference in overall job satisfaction 
between workers holding a permanent contract and those holding a temporary contract. 
This general result is in line with the evidence reported in section 2. When subjected to 
closer scrutiny however, it is apparent that, among temporary workers, seasonal and casual 
workers are likely to be less satisfied with their jobs than permanents workers. This is the 
case also with some specific characteristics of the job such as employment security and 
career path.  
  Beyond job satisfaction, the social integration of the workers on temporary jobs may 
be weakened. Holding a temporary job is often in itself an obstacle to get a loan or to rent a 
flat if the worker does not benefit of external collateral. Cahuc and Kramarz (2005) using 
data from the French LFS show that the access to housing is far more difficult for workers 
on temporary jobs than for those on permanent jobs. 
 Finally, temporary jobs may also be detrimental to health.
37
 A number of recent 
studies have pointed out that workers on temporary contracts have higher injury rate (Nola 
et al., 2001, Guadalupe, 2003),
38
 higher psychological distress (Quesnel-Vallée et al, 2010), 
higher strain and higher anti-depressant medication (Virtanen et al., 2008). 
     
 
37
 See Virtanen et al. (2004) for a comprehensive meta-analysis. 
38
 Saloniemi and Salmimen (2010) have challenged this result. Using Finish data, the authors show 
that the difference in injury rates for temporary and permanent workers is not significant. However, 
the main explanatory factor is sector specific to the extent that temporary jobs are concentrated in 
public services (education and health care) with a predominance of female workers.  
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5. Beyond segmentation: reforming the French labour market 
There is a broad consensus that labour market segmentation impedes a normal 
functioning of the labour market. For instance, Italy and Spain have recently initiated 
reforms intended to reduce labour market segmentation. The issue of how to reform the 
labour market is however more controversial. In the case of France, two lines of proposals 
have been put to the fore. In the former case, the reform consists in strengthening taxation 
on temporary contracts in order to spur the use of open-ended contracts. This is exactly 
what is at the heart of a recent agreement between social partners in France. In the latter 
case, the reform is more structural and promotes the recourse to a single or unified labour 
contract. In what follows, we will present the French national inter-professional agreement 
from January 2013 and make out the general contours of a unified contract as it has been 
discussed in France. 
 5.1. The French national inter-professional agreement from January 201339  
In January 2013, a national inter-professional agreement (ANI) between social 
partners has been signed. However, before we go any further in the description of this 
agreement, it should be noted that at the time this report is written, the transcription of the 
agreement into a draft law has not been achieved, and hence has not been submitted to the 
Parliament.
40
 In this respect, some of the details of the law are not known with certainty at 
this time. 
In a nutshell, the ANI is supposed to create important breakthroughs that will 
significantly improve the functioning of the labour market. It consists in providing more 
security for the firms and the workers and, more relevant for our purposes, it consists in 
bringing down labour market segmentation. In that area, the two key features of the 
agreement relate to temporary contracts and collective dismissals.  
As regards temporary contracts, the employers’ contributions to unemployment 
insurance will be increased for the contracts whose durations are less than three months. 
Today the employers’ contribution rate to unemployment insurance is worth 4 per cent 
whatever the type of contracts. The agreement makes provision for an increase in the 
employers’ contribution rate to 7 per cent for temporary contracts whose duration are less 
than 1 month, and to 5.5 per cent for those whose duration is between 1 and 3 months. 
Special provisions have been introduced for sectors where temporary contracts are 
considered customary (see section 3.1). For this type of contract, i.e. “contrat d’usage”, the 
employers’ contribution rate will be slightly increased to 4.5 per cent for temporary 
contracts whose duration is below 3 months.          
As regards collective dismissals, the legal procedure is modified for large firms, i.e. 
firms with more than 50 employees. This change in the legislation is intended to provide 
more predictability on collective dismissals and hence to prevent long and costly 
procedures by court (see section 3.2.2). The general idea consists in privileging 
 
39
 « Accord national interprofessionnel (ANI) du 11 Janvier 2013 ». The signatory parties are for the 
unions, CFDT, CFE-CGC and CFTC, and for the employers, MEDEF. Details of the ANI can be 
found at: http://direccte.gouv.fr/accord-national-interprofessionnel-du-11-janvier.html 
40
 The draft law will be examined by the parliament in April 2013 and is expected to enter into force 
in May 2013. 
 28 
negotiations between the social partners in order to shorten the duration of collective layoff 
procedures and to enhance ex-ante conciliation. A redundancy programme can be approved 
thanks to a majority agreement between the social partners or through a unilateral 
administrative procedure (“procédure d’homologation”).  In the latter case, the procedure 
will have to take place in two stages. First, the contours of the layoff procedure must be 
presented for consideration to the work council. Second, it shall require an agreement from 
the public administration.
41
 The administration has 21 days to provide an agreement on the 
procedure. If the demand is left unanswered, the agreement is deemed approved. 
It is too early to judge the relevance of the ANI. We may however express reserves 
about the scope of the agreement. First, although the agreement has been acclaimed as an 
ambitious reform of the French labour market, the fact remains that it does not lead to a 
general disruption of the French labour code. In this respect the reform can be seen as 
marginal. Second, temporary contracts with very short duration are overrepresented in 
sectors where customary contracts apply. For instance, for the year 2011 in France, more 
than 56 per cent of the contracts whose duration is shorter than one month are gathered in 
sectors where the “contrat d’usage” applies. Restricting to those sectors, it appears that 
more than 86 per cent of the contracts are shorter than one month (ACOSS, 2011).
42 
It 
follows that the increase in the employers’ contributions to unemployment insurance will 
only be marginal for most temporary contracts. Accordingly, it seems unreasonable to 
expect major changes in hiring practices. Finally and while pointing in the right direction, it 
is unlikely that the reform of collective dismissals, as proposed in the agreement, will be 
sufficient to spur the use of open-ended contracts for at least two reasons. First, it can be 
extremely difficult to reach an agreement with the unions to the extent that two of the 
largest unions (namely CGT and CGT-FO) have not signed the agreement. Second, as it has 
been pointed out by lawyers, the dismissal procedure is likely to initiate new types of 
litigation. In this respect, the enactment of the law will allow to better determine the 
contours of the ANI.   
 4.2. The contours of a single or unified contract 
A natural way to reduce segmentation is to make employment protection homogenous 
across different contractual relations. Proposals adopting this idea put forward a unified or a 
single contract. Such contractual arrangement should of course make firms internalize the 
social cost of their employment practices and impede excess labour turnover, while 
enabling them to restructure in order to become more competitive.  
The key impediment to transitions from STJ to LTJ is the very low transformation rate 
of STJ to LTJ within the same firm. In dual labour markets (as the French one), employers 
face a sharp discontinuity in employment protection when they decide whether or not to 
transform a temporary contract into an open-ended contract. In the French case, this 
discontinuity is driven by the payments that judges can ask recruiters when they consider 
the dismissal of open-ended contract as illegal.  Those payments have a minimum threshold 
of 6 months of wage. For instance, consider the dismissal of worker whose 18 month fixed-
term contract has just been converted into a LTJ. If the dismissal is contested and the 
worker wins, he receives at least 6 months of wage, i.e. one third of the total labour cost (6 
 
41
 Administrative approvals are provided by the « DIrection Régional des Entreprises, de la 
Concurrence, de la Consommation, du Travail et de l’Emploi (DIRECCTE) ». 
42
 More accurately according to the DUE, in the year 2011, there are about 13.24 million temporary 
contracts with duration shorter than one month. Among them about 7.41 million temporary contracts 
are in sectors where the “contrat d’usage” applies. As a whole, there are about 8.54 million 
temporary contracts in those sectors.  
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over 18 months). Before that conversion, the “dismissed” worker would be entitled to only 
10 per cent of total labour cost. The first objective of the unified/single contract is thus to 
suppress this threshold effect and make firing costs vary continuously with seniority. 
Second, it is well-known that dual labour markets foster inefficient labour turnover 
(see section 4). In this respect, a unified or single contract should therefore induce firms to 
internalize the social costs associated with excessive turnover. Such a contract could have 
firing costs decreasing with seniority. This would make labour cost of firms with high 
turnover greater than that of firms investing in long term employment relationship.  
Third, temporary and permanent job do not only differ in the amount of firing costs, 
they also differ in the uncertainty associated to these costs, i.e. in the difficulty to foretell 
the outcome of a dismissal procedure for the firm.  In the French case, firings costs hardly 
exceed statutory severance payments for fixed-term contracts, whereas they vary a lot in the 
case of open-ended contract termination depending on eventual judges’ decisions. The high 
level of uncertainty is clearly inefficient for open-ended contract termination. Proposals for 
a single or unified contract should reduce discretionary decisions on severance payments.  
In the European debate, several authors have promoted the idea of a single/unified 
contract (among others Cahuc and Kramarz 2005, Boeri and Garibaldi 2007, Blanchard and 
Tirole 2008, Bentolila et al. 2012, Cahuc 2012). Single contract reforms suppress fixed-
term contracts, while unified contract reforms preserve the possibility to agree on a 
termination date at the beginning of the employment relation. We detail here the proposal 
by Cahuc (2012) for a unified contract.  
One key ingredient of this reform is that economic restructuring is a serious and 
genuine cause for dismissal. In France, the appreciation of the economic strategy leading to 
job destruction is left to judges. Jurisprudence has lead to a narrow interpretation of 
economic dismissal where the cause is serious and genuine only when the preservation of 
competiveness is at stake. This makes economic restructuring particularly costly and more 
importantly uncertain (see Section 3.2.).  
Cahuc and Kramarz (2005) and Cahuc (2012) proposal for a unified contract applies 
to the French case but is also relevant for a number of European countries. This proposal 
has two main characteristics: First, the legal cost of interrupting the contract depends on the 
employee’s seniority, independently of the nature of the work contract, fixed-term or open-
ended. Second, in the event of contract termination, the employer pays an indemnity to 
employee, and a tax called “solidarity contribution” to the public authorities.  
As regards severance payments, it has been proposed that severance payments should 
amount to 10 per cent of total labour cost for any job lasting less than 18 months. For open-
ended contracts, this proposition increases the statutory rate, but the severance payments 
stay below the typical payments decided in court. For any employment relationship lasting 
more than 1.5 year and less than 10 years, the severance payments should increase by 1/60 
of total labour cost per year of seniority (starting from 1.5 year). This makes firing costs 
decrease continuously with seniority. 
As regards transfers to public authorities, it has been recommended that any economic 
dismissal or fixed-term contract termination should be taxed 1.6 per cent of the total labour 
cost. This new tax would ensure recruiters not to be sued to court except for abusive or 
discriminatory practices. The amount raised by such taxes corresponds to the actual firing 
costs paid by the employers in court after economic dismissal (excl. statutory severance 
payments).  Such a reform would be neutral in terms of overall employment protection. 
This new tax, labelled “solidarity contribution”, would be an extra benefit to the 
unemployment insurance fund and increase the efficiency of the public employment 
service. Firms would be discharged from any reemployment obligation as long as they pay 
the “solidarity contribution”.  
 30 
At this stage, it should be noted that some concerns have been raised as regards the 
feasibility of a single or unified contract from a legal point of view. For instance, it has 
been argued that such contractual arrangement may violate the ILO convention C158 
(Termination of Employment Convention)
43
 and more particularly articles 2 and 4 of the 
convention that specify the conditions under which: (i) a worker can be excluded from the 
protection of the convention; (ii) there is a valid reason for the termination of an 
employment contract. To a large extent these concerns originate from the failure of the new 
employment contract (“Contrat Nouvelle Embauche”, see table 4) that has been declared 
contrary to the C158 convention by the ILO in 2007 and illegal by the French Court of 
Cassation in 2008.
 44
 The outlines of the contract detailed above do not however suffer from 
the same shortcomings as the new employment contract (CNE). In this respect, there does 
not appear to be any significant legal obstacles that prevent the use of a unified contract.  
 
43
 The convention is available online at: 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO:12100:P12100_ILO_CODE:
C158 
44
 For further details see e.g. Lepage-Saucier, Schleich and Wasmer (2013) or the ILO note on 
Convention No. 158 available at: 
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/@ed_norm/@normes/documents/meetingdocument/wcms
_100768.pdf 
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6. Conclusion 
Over the last decades, the surge in unemployment in many Europeans countries has 
favoured reforms at the margin. France is no exception. Those reforms have fostered two-
tier systems, as the increase in labour market flexibility has taken place mainly through a 
series of marginal reforms that liberalized the use of fixed-term and/or non-standard 
employment contracts. Two-tier systems have promoted the emergence of dual employment 
protection, often termed as flexibility-at-the-margin, which can be broadly defined as the 
coexistence of both long-term contracts, which benefit from stringent protection, and short-
term contracts with little or no protection. This combination creates labour market 
segmentation, traps workers in a recurring sequence of frequent unemployment spells, 
favors unequal repartition of risk between workers, enhances inequalities and produces 
uncertain effects on economic outcomes (aggregate employment…).  
As a whole, the French labour legislation in force appears extremely complex and 
unusual in many respects. As a consequence, the enforcement of the law is difficult and the 
law is only apparently very protective. As a matter of fact, the legislation tends to be more 
and more circumvented as indicated by the very few fair or justified dismissals in job 
destruction, the surge in tacit or legal separation agreements (e.g. “rupture 
conventionnelle”) and the abuses in the use of precarious contracts. Put in a nutshell, we 
think the current legislation needs to be modernized and reformed in great depth.  
A possible direction to reform the current legislation is to promote a single/unified 
contract and hence put an end to the current hotchpotch of contractual arrangements. The 
reform should closely follow the spirit of the law and make the open-ended contract (CDI) 
the norm as described in the French labour code which stipulates that the normal and 
general labour contract between a firm and a worker is the permanent or open-ended 
contract. The rights associated with this contract should increase steadily with seniority to 
avoid any threshold effect as in the case of a segmented labour market.  
However, it should be kept in mind that this type of contracts is not an end in itself, 
and should be part and parcel of an overall reform in the labour legislation.  First, we 
support the idea that firing costs should comprise a contribution to the unemployment 
insurance system, possibly decreasing with the seniority or increasing with the churning 
rate (i.e. to promote a system similar in spirit to the US experience rating). Second, we 
think that the reform should be designed to eliminate the incentives to go to court, except 
for discrimination cases, and to prevent the legal system to second guess the decision of the 
firms. Finally, it appears to us of paramount importance that these measures should provide 
genuine security for career paths underpinned by a well designed public employment 
service with efficient counselling and training schemes. 
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Appendix 
 A.1. Data 
French Labour Force Survey (“Enquête emploi”): 
We use LFS from 1991 through 2010. The survey was redesigned in 2003. Prior to 
2003, individuals were surveyed each year in March (except in January for LFS 1999), 3 
years in a row. After 2003, each individual is surveyed each quarter, 6 quarters in a row. 
The redesign implied huge changes in the process of the survey, which results in data issues 
for year 2002.  
From 2003 to 2010, we use the longitudinal structure of the LFS. Quarterly transitions 
are computed following an individual across two surveys. This may induce a bias as 
individuals who change residence are not followed in the survey. 
Before 2002, we compute transitions from a retrospective calendar where individuals 
report their labour status 1 month prior to the interview, 2 months... 12 months prior to the 
interview. Several studies have shown that retrospective data are biased with recall errors. 
This is the price to pay for observing quarterly transitions with annual surveys. Another 
drawback of the LFS retrospective calendar is that it captures rough states (declared 
unemployment and not ILO unemployment; STJ contracts without any distinction for 
seasonal work, temporary help agency work and apprenticeship work).    
 
ACOSS-DUE:  
The DUE (“Déclaration Unique d’Embauche”) is a unique dataset compiled by the 
ACOSS (“Agence Centrale des organismes de Sécurité Sociale”), the agency in charge of 
the management of the French social security. DUE records the universe of the inflows into 
employment in the private sector and in the public sector for non civil servants. 
 
European Working Condition Survey (EWCS):  
We use the 5th wave of the European Working Condition Survey (2010) funded by the 
European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions. A total of 
44,000 workers from 34 European countries were interviewed in 2010 on their working and 
employment conditions. The French sub sample comprises 3 046 workers. 
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A.2. Additional descriptive elements and statistics to Section 2 
Table a   Short Term Job (STJ) Probability (vs. LTJ) 
 (1) 
VARIABLES STJ 
  
ag15_24 0.421*** 
 (0.0200) 
ag35_45 -0.0527*** 
 (0.00298) 
ag45_55 -0.0749*** 
 (0.00262) 
ag55_ -0.0638*** 
 (0.00280) 
women 0.0602*** 
 (0.00215) 
college -0.0172*** 
 (0.00343) 
vocational -0.0407*** 
 (0.00328) 
low_second -0.0198*** 
 (0.00471) 
no_educ -0.0261*** 
 (0.00353) 
Constant 0.136*** 
 (0.00302) 
  
Observations 131,096 
R-squared 0.031 
1. Robust standard errors in parentheses 
2. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Source: LFS 2010 
Note: Linear probability model, reference: male between 25 and 34 years old with upper secondary degree.  
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Table b   Transitions of young individuals (15-24 years old) between LTJ, STJ, unemployment (U) and 
other destinations 
 Current State (T) 
Previous State (T-1) 0.Other 1.U 2.STJ 3.LTJ Total 
 % % % % % 
0.Other 93.7 3.7 1.8 0.9 100.0 
1.U 29.5 55.8 11.4 3.3 100.0 
2.STJ 14.6 10.1 68.8 6.4 100.0 
3.LTJ 4.3 2.7 1.5 91.5 100.0 
Total 76.1 8.3 6.6 9.0 100.0 
Source: LFS 2010.  Authors’ calculations 
 
Table c   Transitions of middle-age individuals (25-49 years old) between LTJ, STJ, unemployment (U) 
and other destinations 
 Current State (T) 
Previous State (T-1) 0.Other 1.U 2.STJ 3.LTJ Total 
 % % % % % 
0.Other 92.5 4.8 1.3 1.4 100.0 
1.U 22.3 63.2 9.4 5.0 100.0 
2.STJ 6.9 8.8 78.5 5.8 100.0 
3.LTJ 1.3 0.8 0.3 97.5 100.0 
Total 36.2 7.7 6.1 50.0 100.0 
            Source: LFS 2010.  Authors’ calculations 
 
Table d  Transitions of senior individuals (50-65 years old) between LTJ, STJ, unemployment (U) and 
other destinations 
 Current State (T) 
Previous State (T-1) 0.Other 1.U 2.STJ 3.LTJ Total 
 % % % % % 
0.Other 98.1 1.3 0.2 0.4 100.0 
1.U 24.7 66.4 6.1 2.8 100.0 
2.STJ 7.4 8.2 80.6 3.8 100.0 
3.LTJ 2.9 0.6 0.1 96.4 100.0 
Total 64.2 3.5 2.1 30.1 100.0 
Source: LFS 2010.  Authors’ calculations 
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Table e  Transitions of individuals with some upper education between LTJ, STJ, unemployment (U) 
and other destinations 
 Current State (T) 
Previous State (T-1) 0.Other 1.U 2.STJ 3.LTJ Total 
 % % % % % 
0.Other 96.0 2.1 1.1 0.8 100.0 
1.U 21.8 57.6 13.0 7.7 100.0 
2.STJ 8.6 6.6 79.5 5.3 100.0 
3.LTJ 1.4 0.7 0.3 97.6 100.0 
Total 52.0 4.2 5.5 38.3 100.0 
  Source: LFS 2010.  Authors’ calculations 
 
Table f   Transitions of individuals with upper secondary education between LTJ, STJ, unemployment 
(U) and other destinations 
 Current State (T) 
Previous State (T-1) 0.Other 1.U 2.STJ 3.LTJ Total 
 % % % % % 
0.Other 94.0 3.4 1.5 1.1 100.0 
1.U 29.2 55.0 11.2 4.6 100.0 
2.STJ 10.9 9.1 74.5 5.5 100.0 
3.LTJ 2.0 0.9 0.4 96.7 100.0 
Total 53.5 6.0 6.0 34.6 100.0 
   Source: LFS 2010.  Authors’ calculations 
 
Table g   Transitions of individuals with vocational education between LTJ, STJ, unemployment (U) and 
other destinations 
 Current State (T) 
Previous State (T-1) 0.Other 1.U 2.STJ 3.LTJ Total 
 % % % % % 
0.Other 94.7 3.5 1.0 0.9 100.0 
1.U 23.4 62.9 9.9 3.9 100.0 
2.STJ 7.8 9.8 75.5 6.9 100.0 
3.LTJ 1.8 0.8 0.3 97.1 100.0 
Total 45.9 6.7 4.5 42.9 100.0 
  Source: LFS 2010.  Authors’ calculations 
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Table h   Transitions of individuals with lower secondary education between LTJ, STJ, unemployment 
(U) and other destinations 
 Current State (T) 
Previous State (T-1) 0.Other 1.U 2.STJ 3.LTJ Total 
 % % % % % 
0.Other 96.6 2.3 0.6 0.5 100.0 
1.U 23.8 65.6 7.6 2.9 100.0 
2.STJ 8.1 12.1 74.1 5.7 100.0 
3.LTJ 2.3 1.0 0.3 96.4 100.0 
Total 67.9 6.2 3.4 22.4 100.0 
 Source: LFS 2010.  Authors’ calculations 
 
Table i   Transitions of individuals with primary education (or less) between LTJ, STJ, unemployment 
(U) and other destinations 
 Current State (T) 
Previous State (T-1) 0.Other 1.U 2.STJ 3.LTJ Total 
 % % % % % 
0.Other 95.2 3.6 0.5 0.7 100.0 
1.U 24.4 66.9 6.1 2.6 100.0 
2.STJ 7.9 10.8 76.6 4.7 100.0 
3.LTJ 2.6 1.0 0.3 96.1 100.0 
Total 59.0 8.5 3.6 28.8 100.0 
Source: LFS 2010.  Authors’ calculations 
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Figure a   Share of LTJ by age 
 
Source: LFS. Authors’ calculations 
 
 
 
 A.3. Further elements on the French legislation: Rupture conventionnelle” 
 “Rupture conventionnelle” or dismissal by mutual consent is a new severance 
modality that has been introduced in 2008.
45
 It is framed by the articles L. 1237-11 to L. 
1237-16 of the French labour code. It obeys specific procedures, applies to open-ended 
contracts only and is exclusive from other modalities such as layoffs for economic reasons 
or quits.  
The cornerstone of this modality is the specification of a contract between the firm and 
the worker that sets out general terms and conditions upon separation (e.g. date of 
termination of the contract, severance payments, notice periods, etc.). Contrary to the case 
of a dismissal for economic reasons (see table 3), the law does not stipulate any 
predetermined length for the notice period which is at the discretion of the two parties. The 
contract gives the right to compensation (“indemnité spécifique de rupture 
conventionnelle”) that can be freely bargained between the firm and the worker but cannot 
be lower than the legal amount paid in case of a dismissal for economic reasons.
46
 Finally 
and contrary to quits, under standard eligibility conditions, the worker is entitled to 
unemployment insurance.  
 
45
 This modality is part of the law number 2008-596, « Portant modernisation du marché du 
travail », introduced by the Fillon government. 
46
 In 2009, according to the DARES (see DARES Analyses, 2011), severance payments under 
“rupture conventionelle” have provided on average a premium of 0.4 month of wage per year of 
seniority compared to the minimum legal amount authorized by the law.  
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Once an agreement has been reached by the two parties, the enforcement of the 
contract is subject to the application of a two weeks revocation period (the firm and/or the 
worker may renege the contract during this period) and then subject to certification by the 
administrative authority.
47
 This authority has two weeks to agree or to reject to the terms 
and conditions of the contract. In the absence of a response from the administrative 
authority, the contract is implicitly/tacitly deemed accepted and the firm and the worker 
separate. 
 
  A.4. A search and matching model of a segmented labour market 
We develop a search and matching model in the spirit of Mortensen and Pissarides 
(1994) that borrows from Bentolila et al. (2012), Cahuc et al. (2012), and Charlot and 
Malherbet (2012). The model incorporates the main characteristics of the French labour 
market.  A summary of relevant details is given in this appendix and we refer the interested 
reader to the above mentioned articles. 
A.4.1. Outline of the model 
The main features of the model are as follows. First, there is a continuum of infinitely 
lived risk-neutral workers and firms, with a common discount rate r > 0. The measure of 
workers is normalized to 1. Job matches have a common idiosyncratic productivity 
distribution G(x), drawn over the support [xl,xu]. The idiosyncratic productivity shocks 
follow a Poisson distribution with incidence rate λ. For the sake of simplicity, it is assumed 
that the productivity of new matches is equal to the upper bound of the productivity 
distribution, as in Mortensen and Pissarides (1994).   
There are two types of contracts: temporary and permanent. Permanent contracts are 
the “regular” type of contracts and do not stipulate any pre-determined duration. They are 
protected by dismissal costs, F, paid by firms. These costs are not transferable to the 
workers and therefore consist in red tape and legal costs rather than severance payments.
48
 
Temporary contracts stipulate a fixed duration and are not renewable.
49
 In contrast with 
most of the previous literature, we assume that temporary jobs cannot be destroyed before 
their date of termination.
50
 Temporary jobs are terminated with per unit of time probability 
ν, at which point firms either convert them to permanent jobs or destroy them at no cost. A 
new value of productivity is drawn upon conversion. 
At their date of termination, temporary jobs can be either destroyed at zero cost or 
transformed into permanent jobs. Trying to mimic realistic wage bargaining procedures, we 
assume that wages in permanent jobs are renegotiated by mutual agreement whereas they 
are fixed in temporary jobs until the contract expire. Unemployed workers have access to 
temporary jobs with probability p, exogenously set as EPL policy, and to initial permanent 
jobs with probability 1 - p. 
 
47
 Certifications are provided by the « Direction Régional des Entreprises, de la Concurrence, de la 
Consommation, du Travail et de l’Emploi (DIRECCTE) ». 
48
 See e.g. Kramarz and Michaud (2010). 
49
 For a theoretical model where temporary contracts are renewable see Cahuc et al. (2012). 
50
 This assumption is in line with actual regulations in many European countries. For further details 
see Cahuc et al. (2012, Appendix A). 
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There are matching frictions on the labour market captured by a standard matching 
function as in Pissarides (2000), with matching rate q(θ) for vacancies and θq(θ) for the 
unemployed. Labour market tightness is given by θ=v/u where v and u are the masses of 
vacancies and unemployment respectively. 
 
A.4.2. Value functions 
Asset values can be defined as follows. Let Πv, Πt, Πns and Πs denote the value to the 
firm of a vacant, a temporary, a new permanent/stable job or a continuing permanent/stable 
job respectively. In the same way, let Wu, Wt, Wns and Ws denote the value to the worker 
of searching for a job, of being employed on a temporary, new or ongoing permanent/stable 
job respectively. 
For firms, we have:  
  
Holding a vacancy involves a flow cost γ and returns a worker at rate q(θ). When a 
contact occurs, the employer-worker pair discovers the type of contract that will be offered. 
A proportion p of workers can be hired on temporary contracts (indexed by t), while the 
remaining 1−p can be hired on new stable jobs (indexed by ns).  
 
Temporary jobs pay a wage w
t
. They can be hit by a productivity shock at a rate λ but 
will necessarily continue until the arrival of the date when the contract expires. Such an 
event arrives with a probability ν per unit of time. A new value of productivity is drawn 
upon termination. Then the job can be converted into a (new) stable job if the productivity 
is sufficiently high, or destroyed at no cost otherwise. 
  
New stable jobs pay a wage w
ns
(x). They are hit by a productivity shock at a rate λ 
and can either be continued as stable jobs or destroyed at a cost F.  
 
Stable jobs pay a wage w
s
(x). They are hit by a productivity shock with probability λ, 
and can either be continued or destroyed at a cost F. 
In a similar vein, we can define the workers’ asset values as follows:  
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For the sake of simplicity, we normalize the utility from leisure to zero. A job seeker 
can meet with a firm at rate θq(θ) . They can be proposed a temporary job at rate p, or hired 
on a new stable job at rate 1−p. In either of the two cases, the value of the match-specific 
productivity always starts at the upper bound of the distribution of productivity. 
  
A worker employed on a type j=t,ns,s contract is paid a wage w
j
. Temporary or 
permanent (stable or new stable) jobs are hit by a productivity shock at rate λ. Permanent 
jobs are either terminated or continued in the event of a shock. Again, temporary jobs will 
necessarily continue until the arrival of the date when they can be destroyed or converted, 
which occurs at rate ν. 
 
A.4.3. Flows 
Let G(x
i
) and 1−G(x
i
) for i=s,ns, denote the cumulative distribution and the survival 
functions respectively. In addition, let us denote the mass numbers of temporary, new 
stable, stable and unemployed workers by T, N, S and U, respectively.  
On average, a worker meets with a firm at Poisson rate θq(θ). As already mentioned, 
firms are only granted to hire a proportion p of their workforce on a short-term basis, due to 
legal restrictions. Accordingly, the remaining proportion, 1−p, is hired on a long-term basis.  
Let x
ns
 denote the productivity threshold below which temporary jobs are not 
converted into (new) stable jobs. Similarly let x
s
 denote the firing thresholds for both stable 
and new stable jobs. Those thresholds can be defined as follows Πs(x
s
)=−F and 
Πns(x
ns
)=0.Long-term jobs (stable or new stable jobs) are destroyed at Poisson rate, 
λG(x
s
), while short-term jobs (temporary jobs) are terminated –not converted– at Poisson 
rate, νG(x
ns
). It can be shown that x
ns
≥x
s
 whenever F≥0, the destruction rate should be 
higher for temporary than for permanent jobs. Finally, temporary jobs are converted into 
stable jobs at Poisson rate,  ν [ ]1−G(xns) . In a steady state, flows are summarized by the 
following equations:  
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The unemployment rate is then given by:  
 
From this expression, we see that unemployment is increasing in the job destruction 
rates λG(x
s
) and νG(x
ns
) for the various types of jobs and a decreasing function of the exit 
rates from unemployment θq(θ). Finally, when p=0, we get an expression similar to e.g. 
Pissarides (2000).  
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A.4.4. Equilibrium 
Job creation is driven by free entry, which implies that firms enter the search market 
until all rents are exhausted. This implies Πv=0. The equilibrium of the model is 
determined by the following set of equations. We refer the interested reader to Cahuc et al. 
(2012), and Charlot and Malherbet (2013) for a thorough derivation of those expressions. 
An equilibrium with endogenous job creation, endogenous job destruction, and dual labour 
contracts is a tuple (x
ns
, x
s
, θ, U) solving the following set of equations: 
 
 
 
A.4.5. Calibration 
In this section, we parameterize the model to assess the effects of the key policy 
parameters on the labour market equilibrium. The parameters and targets used refer to a 
typical Continental European country and are consistent with what can be found in recent 
developments on dual labour markets (see e.g. Bentolila et al., 2012). The length of a 
period is chosen to be a quarter. We set the discount rate r to 1.23 per cent which 
corresponds to a 5 per cent annual discount rate. As is common in the literature, we adopt a 
constant return to scale matching function of the form m(U,V)=kU
α
V
1-α
 where k is a 
mismatch parameter and α is the elasticity of the matching function with respect to 
unemployment. We assume α to be equal to 0.5, which is in the range of the estimates 
obtained by Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001). The value of the bargaining power parameter 
is set to 0.5 so that α==0.5 as is standard in the literature. Given the evidence that wages 
are log-normally distributed, we assume as in Mortensen and Nagypal (2007), that the 
idiosyncratic productivity component is log-normally distributed across the interval [0;5]. 
Accordingly, we set G=logN(,2) where >0 is a scale parameter and  is a shape 
parameter. We set =0.8, in line with the durations of temporary contracts found in e.g. 
Bentolila et al. (2012) for countries like France and Spain. The policy parameters F and p 
are set respectively to represent one third of the quarterly average wage and about 85 per 
cent of entries into temporary jobs as in Bentolila et al. (2012) or Cahuc et al. (2012). 
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Finally, the values of the remaining parameters are then chosen to match: (i) an 
unemployment rate of about 8.5 per cent; (ii) an average quarterly job destruction rate of 4 
per cent for permanent jobs; (iii) a conversion rate for temporary jobs of 15 per cent; (iv) a 
temporary employment rate of 15 per cent. Parameter values are summarized in the table 
below.   
    Table j   Benchmark parameters values 
Baseline parameters 
Parameter 
Nam
e 
Value Parameter Name Value 
Bargaining power β 0.5 Log N-shape parameter σ 1.75 
Matching elasticity α 0.5 Log N-scale parameter ζ -0.75 
Discount rate r 1.23% Min productivity xl 0 
Mismatch parameter k 0.65 Max productivity Xu 5 
Temp. jobs termination rate ν 0.8 rate of productivity shocks λ 0.05 
Temp. jobs approval rate p 0.85 Cost of vacancy γ 0.5 
Perm. Jobs firing costs F 0.33w    
 
The numerical exercises reported in the text proceed as follows: we let the policy 
parameters F and p vary separately, and we depict the response of a number of labour 
market outcomes (e.g. destruction rate, conversion rate, wage premium, unemployment 
duration etc….) to the shifts in those policy parameters. 
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